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Abstract 
This paper presents a comprehensive analysis of the performance of privatized 
banks in developed countries. Consistent with the competitive effects hypothesis 
which asserts that privatization could hurt rivals, we find that the rival banks 
reacted negatively to news of bank privatization in developed countries. The 
competitive effects are stronger in cases where government ownership decreases 
significantly. Contrary to the findings of prior studies that examine the performance 
of privatized banks in developing countries, we find that privatized banks in 
developed countries experienced significant improvements in operating 
performance and stock market performance in the post privatization period.. 
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Competitive and Value Effects of Bank Privatization in Developed Countries 
1 Introduction 
A number of studies have found that privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
improves firms' performance. Megginson et al., (1994), Boubakri and Cosset (1998), and 
Otchere and Chan (2003) document strong performance improvements for their sample of 
privatized firms. Recently, the World Bank organized a conference bank privatization in 
middle and low income countries which culminated in the publication of a special issue of 
the Journal of Banking and Finance on the subject. Most of the studies show marginal 
improvements in performance (see Cull et al, 2005 for a review of the studies). Unlike bank 
privatization in developing countries the privatization of banks in developed countries has 
not been extensively studied. In this paper w e examine the competitive and value effects of 
bank privatization in developed countries. W e expect bank privatization in developed 
countries to have different effects than those of middle and low income countries for a 
number of reasons. 
First, Eckel et al. (1997) argue that the stock market's expectation of the efficiency of 
the privatized firm can be inferred from changes in the rival firms' stock price following the 
privatization announcement. There is more uncertainty associated with governments' 
commitment to privatization in developing countries and the general lack of information for 
investors to analyze and monitor the performance of privatized firms in developing countries. 
Hence, investors' expectations regarding the market effects of privatization announcement 
could differ. The industry counterparts' reaction to privatization announcement in developed 
and developing countries could differ. Second, as Comstock et (2003) argue, less is often 
known about companies that are privatized in emerging markets than in a developed capital 
market; the uncertainties translate into greater risk which could affect the short term and long 
term performance of the privatized banks. Also, unlike in developing countries, most 
privatized banks in developed countries are fully privatized and this allows the banks to 
restructure and pursue profitable but politically unpopular business strategies. 
Furthermore, Perotti and Guney (1993) argue that privatized banks in developing 
countries have strong but perverse incentive to continue to fund former debtors (i.e., state 
enterprises) that are less efficient and more risky than private firms because doing so enables 
them to gain the potential of repayment of previous debt granted to them when the bank was 
a state bank. Given this incentive to continue to fund risky clients, it is not surprising that 
prior studies (including Otchere (2005)) find that privatized banks in developing countries 
under perform. For bank privatization in developed countries where these problems may not 
occur, significant efficiency and profitability gains may materialize after privatization. It is 
therefore reasonable to surmise that the performance of privatized banks in developed 
countries will be better than the performance of privatized banks in developing countries. 
Also, unlike in developing countries, privatized banks in developed countries tend to be of 
substantial size. From the perspective of this study, this is an important feature because such 
large privatization offenngs are likely to have significant intra-industry effects on industry 
counterparts. 
Our results indicate that the industry counterparts' stock price reacted negatively to 
news of bank pnvatization in developed countries. Consistent with the competitive effects 
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hypothesis which asserts that privatization could hurt rivals, w e find that on average the 
shareholders of the rival banks lost 0.26% of their wealth on the announcement day, with 
6 3 % of the rival banks realizing negative abnormal returns. Contrary to the findings of prior 
studies that examine the performance of privatized banks in developing countries, w e find 
that privatized banks in developed countries have not only experienced significant 
improvements in operating performance in the post privatization period, but they have also 
outperformed their industry counterparts. Interestingly, the privatized banks in developed 
countries have significantly improved the quality of their loan portfolios in the post 
privatization period, they have also managed to bring their asset quality in line with the 
industry average. Although the privatized banks embarked on staff attrition, the improvement 
in operating performance was realized not at the expense of employees' income but rather 
through improvement in assets use. The improvement in the post-privatization performance 
is significant even after controlling for persistence in bank performance. The improvement in 
operating performance is reflected in their stock price as they marginally outperformed the 
benchmark index in the long run. A comparison of the performance of privatized banks in the 
developed and developing countries shows that while privatized banks in the developing 
countries were highly capitalized in the pre-privatization period than those in the developed 
countries, privatization appears to have encouraged excessive risk taking among the 
privatized banks in developing countries, with the consequences that they have incurred large 
asset write-downs on non-performing loans and continue to carry high non-performing assets 
than those in the developed countries. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a review of the 
bank privatization literature and hypotheses development. Section 3 describes the data and 
methodology. Our primary results are presented in Section 4. A comparison of the effects of 
bank privatization in developing and developed countries is presented in Section 5. A 
summary and conclusion are provided in Section 6. 
2. Background review and hypotheses development 
Bank privatization, like the privatization of other state enterprises, has been a frequent event 
and has been justified on both economic and political reasons. O n economic grounds, state 
banks have not performed well because of a myriad of reasons. Megginson (2005) attributes 
the abysmal performance to adverse incentives which affected the firms' desire to maximize 
revenue and minimize cost, less monitoring, the difficulty of distinguishing and sanctioning 
non-performing managers, the insatiable desire of politicians to use state banks as tools of 
redistributive policies, and the tendency to use state banks to pursue social goals such as 
maintaining excess employment for political constituencies. In examining the political 
economy of bank privatization and the choice of candidates for privatization, Clark and Cull 
(2002) find that poorly performing banks and smaller banks that are not overly burdened with 
overstaffing are more likely to be privatized. For political reasons, overstaffed banks are less 
likely to be privatized because staff redundancy that accompanies privatization can be 
politically costly to the incumbent government. The foregoing discussion suggests that 
poorly performing and small banks are good candidates for privatization. Berger et al (2005) 
find that state-owned banks that were chosen for privatization had performed poorly in the 
past and these banks significantly improved their performance after pnvatization. 
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In terms of performance changes, most of the earlier studies that analyze bank 
privatization have concentrated on efficiency and operating performance of the privatized 
banks. A conference organized by the World Bank on bank privatization in middle and low 
income countries which culminated in the publication of a special issue of the Journal of 
Banking and Finance in 2005 showed mixed results. For example, Beck et al (2005) examine 
the effects of bank privatization in Nigeria, a macroeconomic and regulatory environment 
that was inhospitable to financial intermediation, and document a significantly positive 
impact from privatization. The authors find that privatization helped close the gap between 
the performance of state-owned banks and private banks in Nigeria, though the performance 
of divested firms never surpassed that of private banks. Boubakri et al (1998) examine the 
post-privatization performance of 81 banks divested by governments of 22 developing 
countries over the period 1986-1998 and find that privatization partly enhances the 
profitability or operating efficiency of the firms. Otchere (2005) analyses the pre- and post-
privatization operating performance of privatized banks relative to that of the rival banks and 
finds no significant improvement in operating performance of privatized banks in middle and 
low income countries. In addition, he finds that the stock price of privatized banks in middle 
and low income countries underperformed the market index in the long run. However, the 
evidence catalogued in Megginson (2005) indicates that the performance of privatized banks 
in transition economies of the Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union has 
been somewhat favorable than that in non-transition developing countries; even so the 
improved performance in these transition economies were realized only after the 
governments had completely relinquished control. 
There has been a relatively few studies on bank privatization in developed countries. 
Verbrugge et al (1999) analyze the pre- and post-privatization performance of a sample of 32 
banks in developed countries and five banks in developing countries and document only 
moderate improvement in performance for privatized banks in developed countries. Braz 
(1999) also examines the nationalization of Portugal's private banks following a military 
coup in 1974, as well as the subsequent re-privatization of these banks after 1990. The author 
finds, among others, that the productive efficiency of the privatized banks increased 
significantly after divestiture, with the banks reducing staff at a significantly more rapid rate 
than public banks. Otchere and Chan (2003) conduct a case study of the impact of the 
privatization of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia on the bank itself as well as on its 
domestic rivals and find that not only did the financial and operating performance of the 
privatized bank significantly improved after privatization, but the performance indeed 
surpassed that of the major rivals. Interestingly, they find that the privatized bank's long-run 
stock price performance is inversely related to the government's ownership stake in the bank; 
the lower the government ownership, the better the firm's performance. 
The single-country studies that examine privatization in developed countries 
including Otchere and Chan (2003) provide narrow insights into the effects of bank 
privatization in developed countries. The majority of the other studies that analyze bank 
o Z t i n " ^ ° P 1 C ° U n t r i e S haVC f ° f U S e d p r i m a r i ly o n the Pre" a n d Post-privatization 
to2L^rancc/pnvi^edbanks- However'such trend analysis has thetendency 
to obscure the true performance improvements if the industry is undergoing changes. Indeed, 
1
 See Megginson (2005) for a review of bank privatization studies. 
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such analyses do not show h o w the privatized banks' performance measures up to that of the 
rival banks in the country. In this study, w e compare the performance of privatized banks to 
that of their industry counterparts in developed countries. Verbrugge et al., (1999) argue that 
this type of analysis allows for the separation of the effects of privatization from general 
banking trends. W e provide further evidence on the performance of privatized banks in 
developed countries and subsequently compare the performance to that of privatized banks in 
developing countries. 
Though, in general, the literature suggests that privatization improves performance of 
the privatized firms, privatization can also have significant effects on industry counterparts. 
The pressures of product market competition may also compel the newly privatized firms to 
operate more efficiently, aggressively and competitively if they are to survive in the post-
privatization period. Otchere (2005) also argues that following privatization, the firms could 
retain significant market power (on account of their hitherto monopoly status) while being 
relieved of the requirements to follow government directives designed to promote social 
goals. The privatized firms could exploit this market power to their advantage to increase 
profitability. The foregoing discussion suggests that the former state-owned bank could 
become a stronger competitive force for the rivals because of their dominant position in the 
product market. The privatization of a firm could hurt rival banks through increased 
competition; hence, the rivals could react negatively to privatization announcements. Thus, 
the stock market's expectation of the efficiency of the privatized firm can be inferred from 
changes in the rival firms' stock price following privatization announcement. W e examine 
this conjecture in this study. 
Bank privatization could also bode well for rival banks and therefore could generate 
positive information effects for the industry counterparts in a number of ways. First, 
privatization could lead to the relaxation of the rules of operations in the industry. 
Deregulation that accompanies or precedes privatization could unlock growth opportunities 
for all firms in the industry. Second, the presence of a rejuvenated competitor in the industry 
following the privatization could spur the rival firms to perform better if they are not to lose 
market share to the privatized firm. Hence, if the market believes that industry counterparts 
could achieve parallel gains as the privatized firms, then their stock price would increase in 
response to privatization announcement. Also, the loss of non-competitive incentives such as 
subsidies and tax cuts to the privatized firm could make the privatized banks less 
competitive, at least in the short term, relative to the industry counterparts. Thus bank 
privatization announcements could elicit positive stock market reaction for the rival banks. 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
W e obtained the list of privatized banks from the World Bank and the supplemental appendix 
to Megginson (2000). W e use the World Bank country classification to identify our list of 
developed countries. The privatization announcement dates were identified from Reuters 
business news archives.2 Privatization usually takes a long time to yield gains as more time 
2
 The announcement date relates to the first time that the government announced its intention to privatize 
firm. 
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 nftha nrivati/ed firm to overcome organizational inertia 
may be required by ™ ° * ^ ? £ Z ^ » * privatized firms. W e therefore use 5 
and resistance to change that ^ u a l l ^ ^ e " data and 5 years post-privatization operating 
years pre-privatizat.on.operant*5 performa" da ^ J P P ^
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performance and stock market data to assess the pertor F Datastream 
obtain the stock price and financta — « t d 'a rom B a n S c o p ^ ^ . ^ ^ 
the country ax me umc ui F finfl„rij,i statements to be aval able from the 
I Z S E . ~ A" S U ^ b " . 3 5 in «he country a, the time of 
hrpZuzation were initially considered as rival banks. To reduce confounding effects we 
excluded rival b a n k s that announced signiftcant events around the event penod. W e were 
able to obtatn the necessary data for 56 banks privatization trat.sact.ons that occurred 
between 1981 and 1999 and 84 rival banks. 
[Fix Table 1 here] 
Descriptive statistics for the sample firms are presented in Table 1. Panel A shows the 
distribution of the sample, while Panel B presents summary statistics on the share issue. The 
data show that most of the bank privatizations occurred in the latter half of the 1990s. About 
7 % of the issues were reserved for employees, while a third of the shares were issued to 
foreign investors. The mean (median) gross proceeds from the privatization were $817 
million ($385 million), which are much larger than the $156 million ($66 million) 
documented for developing countries by Otchere (2005). As mentioned earlier, these large 
privatizations could have significant competitive effects on other banks. 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Stock market effects 
3.2.1.1 Industry counterpart's reaction to privatization announcement in developed 
countries 
News about privatization could arrive incrementally over time rather than reaching the 
market on a specific date. At a minimum, given the well publicized nature of privatization, a 
narrow focus on the 'official' announcement date could give a limited perspective of the 
information effects of privatization announcement. Therefore, to broadly investigate the 
announcement effects of privatization on industry counterparts, we consider a wider event 
period (5 days before and 5 days after the announcement). The rival banks' reaction to 
privatization announcements is calculated on a market-adjusted basis.3 To obtain market-
adjusted daily abnormal returns, we adjusted the individual bank's daily returns for the 
contemporaneous returns of the market. Designating the announcement date as day 0, we 
estimated the abnormal returns over the 11 days surrounding the announcement date. The 
daily market-adjusted abnormal returns were then averaged across all banks and cumulated 
3
 Since the privatized banks did not have stock price data, w e use the market-adjusted method to compute their 
returns. To be consistent, w e use the same method to compute the rival banks' short run abnormal returns 
follow ing the privatization announcement. 
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the abnormal returns by summing the daily market-adjusted returns across different event 
windows. Then t-tests were estimated by dividing the abnormal returns bv their 
contemporaneous cross sectional standard errors. 
3.2.1.2 Long run stock returns to investors in bank share issue privatization 
The long run stock market performance of the sample firms is examined by analyzing the 
returns of the privatized banks and those of the rival banks. To examine the conjecture that 
pnvatization would give the management of the privatized banks the liberty to pursue 
growth-oriented but perhaps politically unpopular policies that will enable them to generate 
higher returns for investors, w e compare the 5-year post privatization returns of our 
privatized banks sample with the returns of rival banks using the market-adjusted method. 
The market-adjusted abnormal return is the difference between the individual bank's returns 
and the returns of the benchmark index in the respective country. The abnormal returns are 
calculated using the same procedure as described above except that here, w e use monthly 
returns. 
Researchers including Barber and Lyon (1997), Fama (1998), Mitchel and Stafford 
(2000), and Brav (2000) have expressed concerns about methodologies employed in long 
term event studies. One concern expressed by these authors relates to the statistical test of 
long run abnormal returns. The implicit assumption underlying the statistical test is that the 
abnormal returns are independent. However, c o m m o n industry factors affect returns of firms 
in the same industry. Hence, part of the abnormal returns realized by the privatized banks 
could be due to industry factors if, for example, there is a contemporaneous upward trend in 
the banking industry stock returns. To address this concern, w e also calculate industry-
adjusted abnormal returns as the difference between the returns of the privatized banks and 
the industry counterparts' returns. The sample firms' abnormal returns for each month are 
obtained by taking the average across all the rivals. These industry-adjusted returns are 
subsequently cumulated over different event periods for 5 years following privatization. W e 
conduct t-tests by dividing the abnormal returns by their contemporaneous cross sectional 
standard errors. 
3.2.2 Operating performance 
W e examine the pre- and post-privatization operating performance of the privatized banks 
using the C A M E L performance measures that have been employed by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation and other researchers, including Persons (1999), to assess the 
performance of banks. C A M E L , as used in this study, stands for Capital adequacy, Asset 
quality, Management efficiency, Earnings ability and Labor (employment levels). Capital 
adequacy ratio is the total of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital and is measured as the ratio of capital 
to risk-adjusted assets and off-balance sheet exposure determined on a risk-weighted basis of 
at least 8%. A higher ratio reflects the bank's ability to absorb unanticipated capital losses. 
The Asset Quality measures relate to the impairment of bank loans, the asset with the highest 
probability of deterioration. Three measures that the banking industry uses to measure loan 
quality problems, namely, provisions-to-total loans, the ratio of impaired assets (non-
performing loans) to total loans, and net impaired assets-to-total loans are employed in this 
study. A privatized bank may aggressively build its loan portfolio and could be forced to 
make large provisions for unanticipated bad debts. It is also possible that a privatized bank 
may be more efficient in managing its loan portfolio and therefore carry only a small loan 
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loss provision. W e analyze provisions-to-loans ratio to ascertain h o w efficiently privatized 
banks have managed their loan portfolios. In recognition of bank income smoothing practices 
nvolvmg making higher provisions than necessary when credit quality and net income are 
high and not increase provisions as much if credit quality is detenorating w e use the ratio of 
gross impaired assets-to-loans and net impaired assets-to-loans as additional measures of 
asset quality, as these ratios alleviate the problem that banks m a y have underestimated their 
loan provisions. Higher ratios reflect poor asset quality. 
In terms of management efficiency, w e employ operating efficiency measures such as 
cost-to-income ratio and expense-to-asset ratio as proxies for management efficiency Lower 
ratios reflect higher management efficiency. Given the greater emphasis on profitability, the 
privatized banks would be more efficient than they were prior to the privatization. Bank 
earnings ability is measured using three profitability ratios. First, w e use net interest margin 
and return on assets ( R O A ) as measures of profitability. However, as argued by Rhoades 
(1998), R O A is baised upwards for banks that earn significant profits from off-balance sheet 
operations such as derivative activities, as these activities generate revenue and expenses but 
not assets. Consequently, w e employ return on equity (ROE) as an alternative measure of 
profitability. Privatization leads to the transfer of both control and cash flow rights to 
managers w h o are more interested in profits and efficiency than the politicians. Therefore, 
w e expect the profitability of the privatized banks to increase following their privatization. 
Finally, there is evidence that politicians use banks and other state-owned enterprises to 
provide employment and subsidies to cronies in return for votes. W e conjecture that 
following privatization, banks may reduce their employment levels in order to be competitive 
and profitable. W e analyze growth in staff levels to determine whether the privatized banks 
reduced staff levels after privatization. The definition of the ratios grouped under the 
C A M E L criteria is presented in Appendix 1. 
The change in operating performance is first examined by comparing the privatized 
banks' operating performance measures from year -5 to year +5. T o account for the impact 
of possible contemporaneous events w e also report industry-adjusted performance measures 
for the privatized banks which w e calculated as the difference between the privatized banks' 
mean ratios and those of the industry counterparts. The significance of the mean change in 
the pre-privatization period (year -5 to year -1) and the post-privatization period (year 1 to 
year 5) performance is examined by a t-test, while the significance of the median ratios are 
examined using the Wilcoxon sign rank test. 
4 Results: 
4.1 Stock market effects 
4.1.1 Industry counterparts' reaction to privatization announcements in developed 
countries 
The market reaction by the rival banks to the privatization announcements is presented in 
Table 2. Consistent with the competitive effects hypothesis which posits that privatization 
could hurt rivals, w e find that the rival banks reacted negatively to the announcements. The 
4
 Gunther and Moore, (2000) argue that income smoothing ensures that banks with asset quality problems can 
raise net income and retained earnings, thereby boosting Tier 1 capital. 
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shareholders of the rival banks lost 0.26% of their wealth on the announcement day (t-
statistic is 2.49), with 6 3 % of the rival banks realizing negative abnormal returns The 
cumulative abnormal returns ( C A R ) for the [-1, 0] period of 0.33% is also significant at 5 % 
(t-statistic = 1.98). B y the end of the third day following the privatization announcement the 
rival banks had lost 0.47% of their wealth (t-statistic = 1.67). While the abnormal returns for 
all the event windows are negative, the reaction seems to have occurred in the days 
immediately following the announcement, as statistically significant negative abnormal 
returns are documented only for the day -1 to day +3. The cumulative abnormal returns 
realized by the rival banks in the much longer event window of [-5,+5] are not statistically 
significant at conventional levels. The median abnormal returns for the rival banks are also 
similar in magnitude to the mean returns. The results presented in Panel A are consistent 
with the competitive effects hypothesis. 
[Fix Table 2 here] 
If w e assume that government control bodes ill for the state banks, then the 
competitive effects will increase as the proportion of government ownership reduces in 
subsequent partial privatization announcements and the firm gradually moves towards full 
privatization. Hence, the rival firms could react more strongly to subsequent privatization 
announcement than the 'initial' partial privatization announcement.5 To test this conjecture, 
w e examine the rival banks' reaction to the initial and subsequent privatization 
announcements and present the results in Panel B of Table 2. The rival banks' reaction to 
subsequent privatization announcement seems to drive the combined results presented in 
Panel A as the initial privatization announcements did not elicit significant reaction from 
industry counterparts. W e note that as the proportion of government ownership in the 
privatized banks reduces, subsequent partial privatization announcements generate stronger 
adverse stock market reaction from rival banks. Shareholders of rival banks lost 1.01% of 
their wealth in the five days immediately following the announcement of the subsequent sale 
of government shares in the privatized banks. The short run results presented in this section 
suggest that investors view privatization announcements as foreshadowing bad news for rival 
banks. 
4.1.2 Long run industry-adjusted stock market performance 
The long run industry-adjusted abnormal returns realized by the privatized banks are 
summarized in Table 3. Columns 2 and 3 show the yearly industry-adjusted abnormal returns 
for the privatized banks, while columns 5 and 6 present the industry adjusted cumulative 
abnormal returns. The results show that in general, on a year-by-year basis the privatized 
banks performed better than the rival banks in the years following the privatization as the 
5
 It is also possible that for privatizations that occur in tranches, the market may learn from the initial partial 
privatization announcement; hence, the first privatization announcement could contain more surprise. Tnerelore 
the initial privatization announcement could elicit stronger reaction from rivals than subsequent partial 
privatization announcements. 
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industry adjusted abnormal returns are not significant at conventional levels, ^ e median 
returns realized by the privatized banks are significantly greater than those realized by the 
industry counterparts. In the second and fourth years, the privatized banks median industry-
adjusted abnormal returns of 8 % and 5.76% are significant at 1 % and 5 % respectively^ 
privatized banks' cumulative industry-adjusted abnormal returns also show a similar pattern. 
The mean industry adjusted cumulative abnormal returns are mostly posrtrve and only the 
median cumulative adjusted returns of 5.84% realized during the first two years are 
significant at 1 0 % In summary, w e note that the privatized banks marginally performed 
better than the rival banks. Our long run results contrast with those of Megginson et al, 
(2000) and Levis (1993) w h o find that privatized firms earn signrficantly positive abnormal 
returns in the long run. 
[Fix table 3 here] 
4.2 Analysis of operating performance 
4.2.1 Tren d an a lysis 
W e first present the privatized banks' median operating performance measures in Table 4 
with the view to examining any trends in performance over the pre- and post-privatization 
period. The results indicate that for most of the pre-privatization period, the privatized banks 
were minimally capitalized at 8.11% (minimum capital adequacy ratio requirement is 8%). 
There has been an improvement in risk-adjusted capital from 8.77 four years before 
privatization to 13.11 in the year of privatization and 10.8 five years after privatization. This 
suggests that the banks in these countries were relatively undercapitalized in the pre-
privatization period perhaps because of the existence of implicit government guarantees. The 
privatized banks in developed countries have also experienced improvements in all the three 
asset quality ratios. The provisions-to-total loans, non-performing loans, (the ratio of gross 
impaired assets to total loans), and net impaired assets-to-total loans fell from 2.15%>, 7.89% 
and 6.98% five years before privatization to 0.88%, 3.51% and 2.76% respectively five years 
after privatization. In light of the limitations of income smoothing, the reduction in the non-
performing loans (gross impaired assets to total loans, and net impaired assets-to-total loans) 
is remarkable. 
[Fix Table 4 here] 
The management efficiency measures have also generally improved. Though the cost 
to income ratio has not shown any appreciable change, the expense-to-asset ratio has fallen 
as much as 5 0 % from 14.03% five years before the privatization to 7.59% five year after 
privatization. The profitability ratios do not show any significant trend over the pre- and 
post-privatization periods. However, the privatized firms' performance is notable for the 
change in staff levels. The sample firms have reduced their staff levels markedly over the 
6 
Our results are however, consistent with those of Gleason et al (2003) who document insignificant long run 
price improvements for bidders that purchased privatized financial services. However, Gleason et al's evidence 
perhaps reflects the long run underperformance of bidders in mergers and acquisitions rather than privatization 
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pre- and post-privatization period, with the reduction in employment levels in the years 
preceding the pnvatization and continuing five years after privatization. These results are 
dtfferent from those documented by Megginson et al. (1994) and Boubakri and Cosset 
(1998), albert therr samples consist of primarily non-banks. 
4.2.2 Industry-adjusted operating performance 
It is possible that the changes in the operating performance measures occurred because of 
industry effects but not privatization per se. To illustrate this point and the importance of 
estimating industry-adjusted performance measures, recall that the privatized banks reduced 
employment in the post privatization period (see table 4). However, if the reduction in 
employment levels by the rival banks was greater than the staff attrition carried out by the 
privatized banks, then the industry adjusted change in employment levels by the privatized 
firm would be positive. Therefore, to account for the impact of possible contemporaneous 
events w e also report industry-adjusted performance measures for the privatized bank. The 
industry-adjusted performance measures were calculated as the difference between the 
privatized banks' mean ratio and that of the rival banks. Panel C of Table 4 and Table 5 
contain the difference in mean tests for the privatized banks and the rivals. Interesting 
findings emanate from the results. 
First, the mean capital adequacy ratio for the privatized banks was higher in the pre-
privatization period than in the post privatization period. A s compared to the rival banks, the 
privatized banks were indeed well capitalized. The reduced capital adequacy ratio of 11.26% 
in the post privatization period is in line with industry counterparts of 11.03%. Consistent 
with the assertion that government banks carry large loan loss provisions, w e find that the 
privatized bank carried much high impaired asset than their industry counterparts. The loan 
loss provision ratio and the gross impaired assets-to-loans ratio of 2.15% and 6.44% in the 
pre-privatization period were significantly higher than those of their rivals of 0.99% and 
3.62%) at the 1 % and 5 % respectively in the post privatization period. Interestingly, not only 
have the privatized banks significantly improved the quality of their loan portfolios after the 
privatization, with their provisions-to-loan ratio, gross impaired assets-to-loan ratio and the 
net impaired assets-to-loans ratio reducing from 2.15%, 6.44% and 4.14% in the pre-
privatization period to 0.85%, 3.74% and 2.99% respectively in the post privatization period, 
but they have also managed to bring their asset quality ratios in line with the industry 
average. The exception is the net impaired assets to total loan portfolio which is marginally 
higher than that of the industry counterparts. 
[Fix Table 5 here] 
In addition, the privatized banks have been able to reduce their expense-to asset ratio 
from 9.87% to 8.62% in the post privatization period (t-statistic for the difference in mean is 
2.04); however, they are still less efficient relative to their industry counterparts, as their cost 
to income ratio of 87.93% is marginally higher than that of their counterparts of 85.26%. 
Similarly, the privatized banks' earnings generating capacity has improved, with the net 
interest margin, R O A and R O E increasing from 2.72%, 0.37% and 6.91% to 4.57%, 0.73/o 
and 11.14% respectively, albeit none of these changes is significant at conventional levels. 
While these improvements have enabled the privatized banks to narrow the gap with their 
counterparts, their ability to generate returns on their assets still lags behind that of the 
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industry counterparts; their R O A of 0.73% is significantly less than that of their rivals of 
0.97% at the 1 0 % level. Moreover, the privatized banks embarked on significant staff 
significant staff attrition. Although staff levels decreased significantly, the improvement in 
operating performance came not at the expense of employees' income (since the cost-to-
income ratio did not change) but through improvement in assets use, as R O A increased and 
the expense-to-asset ratio improved in the post privatization period. 
4.2 Robustness test: Persistence in Bank performance 
There is evidence of persistence in bank performance (Berger et al. 1999), and Brown and 
Geotzmann (1995).7 Berger et al suggest that product market competition in the banking 
industry can generate market power and allow firms to perform consistently above the 
industry's performance distribution. There is also evidence that candidate firms for 
privatization go through a period of corporatization where the firms operate on commercial 
basis and improve their performance before the privatization is undertaken. It is possible that 
part of the post privatization improvements in performance w e document for the sample 
firms could be due to the persistence of the pre-privatization period performance. To account 
for persistence in bank performance, w e estimate for each variable, a regression of the mean 
post privatization operating performance measures on their corresponding pre-privatization 
measures. If there is persistence in performance, the coefficient of the pre privatization ratio 
will be significant. A significant intercept will suggest that after controlling for persistence in 
performance, privatization yields significant improvement in the operating performance of 
the sample. The results of the regression are presented in Table 6. W e observe significant 
evidence of persistence in the net interest margin and capital adequacy ratios. Most of the 
operating performance measures including the capital adequacy ratio, provisions-to-loans; 
gross impaired assets, net impaired assets, R O E , R O A and expense-to-asset ratios remain 
significant even after controlling for persistence. 
[Fix Table 6 here] 
5. Differential effects of bank privatization in developed and developing countries 
In this section, w e compare our results of bank privatization in developed countries to those 
ot Otchere (2005) who examines bank privatization in developing countries. W e expect the 
performance of privatized banks in developed countries to be different from that of privatized 
banks in developing countries for a number of reasons. The first relates to differences in 
investor expectations and uncertainties regarding the performance of privatized firms in these 
countries. There is more uncertainty associated with a government's commitment to 
privatization in developing countries. Furthermore, as Comstock et al (2003) argue less is 
coulLTThV UlC°7anieS ^ Privatized in devel°Pin§ countries th™ in developed 
countries, the uncertainties translate into greater risk which may influence the setting of the 
d S ^ ^ ^ S)Tr aYower s S o f ^ " ** T / ^  *" «* ^ ' » P « * ™ « 
for the industry (IrowrTand1 GeoZnT1995) " ^ ° f **l6Vd p r ° f i t S t0 an ™ ™ & Proflt level 
12 
initial price and the long run performance of the privatized firms.8 Boehmer et al (2003) find 
that bank privatization in n o n - O E C D countries is determined by the (low) qu % of the 
banking system in those countries whereas in developed countries; poor fiscal conditions ar 
he most important determinants of bank privatization. For comparison purposes, w e exam n 
the differential reaction to privatization announcements and the long run stock mTrket 
performance and then examine the differences in operating performance between privatized 
banks rn developed countries and developing countries. W e summarize the key results of the 
two studres in Table 7. 
[Fix Table 7 here] 
The industry counterparts in both the developed and developing capital markets 
reacted negatively to pnvatization announcements, suggesting that the competitive effects are 
pervasive. However, the magnitude of the abnormal returns realized by the rival banks in 
developing countries is larger than that realized by their counterparts in the developed 
countries. This could be explained by the fact that in developing countries, because of lack of 
competition, the privatized banks m a y retain dominant market share, hence, the competitive 
effects of privatization could be greater. Also, w e observe that there was a delayed reaction to 
the privatization announcement in the developing countries, as most of the significant 
abnormal returns occurred in the period following the announcement. This may be 
symptomatic of the level of market efficiency, with information being incorporated slowly 
into stock price in developing countries. The long run industry-adjusted abnormal returns for 
the privatized banks in the developed markets are primarily positive, suggesting that they 
outperformed their industry counterparts. O n the other hand, the privatized firms in 
developing countries underperformed their industry counterparts, albeit most of the returns 
are not statistically different. 
In terms of operating performance, we observe that the privatized banks in the 
developed countries experienced significant improvements in operating performance in the 
post privatization period. Their asset quality and profitability measures improved, albeit the 
latter ratios are not statistically significant. O n the other hand, the privatized firms in 
developing countries experienced only a marginal improvement in the provisions to loans 
ratio. Once w e account for the effects of industry-wide trends, the quality of the asset 
portfolios of the privatized banks in the developed countries has become similar to that of the 
private banks. O n the other hand, the performance of the privatized banks in developing 
countries is notable for their low asset quality problems, as they continue to carry high non-
performing assets. Though privatized banks in both the developed and developing countries 
have reduced staff levels, those in the developed countries have laid off a significant large 
percentage of their labor force. 
Interestingly, the privatized banks in the developing countries were highly capitalized 
in the pre-privatization period than those in the developed countries, reflecting the weak 
banking system and perhaps, the governments' directive to increase their capital adequacy 
ratios. It appears however, that privatization has encouraged excessive risk taking with the 
8
 There is evidence that the long run performance of privatized firms is inversely related to the level of 
underpricing, such that the best initial performers (highly underpriced offers) tend to be the worst long run 
performers (Aggarwal and Rivoli, 1990; Loughran and Ritter, 1995; and Comstock et al, 2003). However, lack 
of data on issue price precludes the analysis of this issue for our sample. 
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consequence that the privatized banks in developing countries have incurred large asset 
write-downs on non-performing loans. The finding of high asset qualrty problems for the 
privatized firms in developing counties also supports Perotti and Guney (1993) argument that 
privatized banks in developing countries have strong but perverse incentive to continue to 
fund former debtors (i.e., state enterprises) that are less efficient and more risky than private 
firms because doing so enables them to gain the potential of repayment of previous debt 
granted to them when the bank was a state bank. 
The difference in the performance of privatized banks in the developed and the 
developing countries can also be attributed to factors relating to the nature of the capital 
markets. Megginson et al. (1994), suggest that capital market monitoring that accompanies 
privatization triggers improvements in performance. Holstrom and Tirole (1998) also argue 
that the benefits from capital market monitoring depend on the level of sophistication of the 
capital market. A well-developed and active capital market allows the newly privatized firms 
greater access to capital needed to finance profitable projects. The relatively better 
performance of the privatized banks in developed countries perhaps reflects these 
differences. The underperformance documented for privatized firms in developing countries 
could also be due to the fact that the sample firms are mostly partially privatized firms (88% 
in developing countries according to Otchere (2005) versus 4 3 % in developed countries, see 
Table 1). While it has been documented that privatization often leads to improvements in 
efficiency and profitability, the degree to which these benefits can be realized depends on 
whether or not the government fully privatizes the enterprise. For privatized firms in 
developing countries, the continued government ownership could hinder the managers' 
ability to restructure the banks. Brock (2000), Otchere and Chan (2003) and Megginson 
(2005) find that performance improvements for privatized banks appear to occur only after 
connections to the government and the associated soft budget constraints are severed. The 
partial autonomy that the privatized banks in developing countries gain after privatization can 
also explain why they continue to carry higher non-performing loans than their peers. Since 
the relationship with the government is not completely severed, partially privatized banks 
may continue to subsidize former debtors by granting them concessionary loans. Even for 
those that are fully privatized, Perotti and Guney (1993) show that some privatized banks in 
certain developing countries have strong, but perverse, incentive to continue to fund former 
state owned enterprises although these enterprises are more risky than private firms. By so 
doing, they gain the potential of repayment of previous debt granted to them when the bank 
was a government-owned bank. Thus debt overhang could affect the performance of the 
privatized banks in developing countries. 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
We present a comprehensive analysis of the performance of privatized banks in developed 
capital markets and find that privatization announcements elicited negative reaction from 
industry counterparts and that the negative effects are more pronounced in the case of 
subsequent tranche sale where the proportion of government ownership in the privatized 
banks is reduced. The negative share price response of the industry counterparts provides 
evidence that is consistent with the competitive effects hypothesis and suggests that investors 
view privatization announcements as foreshadowing bad news for rival banks Contrary to 
the findings of previous studies, w e find that the privatized banks in developed countries 
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have achieved significant improvements in operating performance. For example they have 
not only improved the qualrty of their loan portfolios after privatization, but they have alio 
managed to bring their asset quality measures in line with the industry average. 
Although the privatized banks embarked on significant staff attrition the 
improvement in operating performance was achieved not at the expense of employees' 
salaries but rather through improvement in assets use. The post-privatization performance 
rmprovement rs srgnrficant even after controlling for persistence in bank performance A 
comparison of the performance of privatized banks in the developed and developing 
countries reveals one notable difference; that is, those in developing countries continue to 
carry high non-performing assets. Interestingly, the privatized banks in the developing 
countries were highly capitalized in the pre-privatization period than those in the developed 
countries; pnvatization appears to have encouraged excessive risk taking among the 
privatized banks in developing countries with the consequences that they have incurred larger 
asset write-downs on non-performing loans than those in the developed countries. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the sample 
The table presents the frequency distribution and summary statistics for our sample of 56 
privatized banks from developed countries for which w e were able to obtain daily and 
monthly stock price data and income statements. Panel A presents the frequency distribution 
of the privatized banks, while Panel B shows the summary statistics for the privatization 
Panel A: Distribution of privatization 
COUNTRY 
Australia 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Total 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics 
V A R I A B L E 
Issue size ($ U S M L N ) 
% of capital offered 
% reserved for employees 
% reserved for foreign Investors 
N o of Shareholders created 
% Govt, owned before 
% Govt, owned after 
No. of firms 
3 
1 
7 
7 
11 
1 
6 
14 
4 
2 
56 
MEAN 
817.0303 
38.5 
7.644762 
34.80714 
540067.4 
76.48691 
40.02636 
Yearly t requenc; 
Distribution 
1981 
1984 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
Total 
MEDIAN 
385 
31.5 
8.6 
31.6 
64843 
83 
43.6 
1 
1 
1 
7 
1 
3 
2 
5 
7 
12 
6 
4 
4 
1 
1 
56 
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Table 2: Industry counterparts' reaction to privatization announcements 
This table presents the rival banks' abnormal returns reahzed over different return intervals. Abnormal returns 
are calculated using the market-adjusted model as the difference between the bank's returns and the return of 
the market index in the respective country. The returns are cumulated over the -5 to +5 interval. Panel A shows 
the full sample results. Panel B present the results for the initial privatization announcements, while Panel C 
shows the results for subsequent privatizations. The percentage negative is the ratio of firms that realized 
negative abnormal returns to the total sample for the respective event windows. The symbols ***, **, *, 
represent significance at 1, 5 % and 10% respectively. 
% Mean Returns t-statistics p-value Percent negative %Median Returns 
Panel A: Industry counterpart's reaction to privatization announcements 
CAR (-1,0) -0.33 -1.99** 0.05 60 -0.43 
0 -0.26 -2.49** 0.02 63 -0.26 
CAR (0+1) -0.21 -1.14 0.26 59 -0.26 
CAR (0+2) -0.39 -1.05 0.29 58 -0.53 
CAR (0+3) -0.25 -0.95 0.34 52 -0.19 
CAR(0,+4) -0.40 -1.05 0.29 54 -0.26 
CAR (0+5) -0.37 -1.05 0.29 58 -0.53 
CAR(-1,+2) -0.33 -1.26 0.20 56 -0.47 
CAR (-1+3) -0.47 -1.67* 0.10 58 -0.47 
CAR (-1+1) -0.23 -1.37 0.17 60 -0.43 
CAR (-2+2) -0.70 -1.48 0.14 56 -0.34 
CAR (-5+5) -0.68 -1.20 0.23 53 -0.30 
Panel B: Industry counterpart's reaction to the first privatization announcements 
0.10 0.19 0.85 48 0.16 
-0.24 -0.65 0.52 56 -0.24 
.0.28 -1.00 0.32 63 -0.56 
-0.74 0.46 58 -0.24 
-1.21 0.23 62 -0.26 
-0.34 0.74 50 -0.06 
-0.44 0.66 48 0.04 
0.35 0.73 46 0.03 
CAR(o',+5) 0.12 0.26 0.80 52 -0.09 
CAR (-5+5) 
CAR (-2+2) 
CAR (-1+1) 
CAR(0) -0.11 
CAR (0+1) -0.28 
CAR (0+2) -0.11 
CAR (0+3) -0.16 
CAR (0+4) 0.15 
CAR (-1,0) -0.11 -0.50 0.62 58 -0.38 
CAR (-1+2) -0.11 -0.32 0.75 52 -0.49 
CAR (-1 +3) -0 16 -0.42 0.68 54 -0.24 
Pane C: Industry counterpart's reaction to the subsequent privatization announcements 
CAR (-5,-5) -1-78 -1-57 0.12 58 -0.86 
CAR-2,-2 -1-22 -1.18 024 ;• 
CAR(-1,+1) -0.26 -0.77 0.45 58 -024 O M K -l,t| -u.^u - _ 0 5 4 
CAR(0) -0.45 -3.02*** 0.00 68 0.54 
CAR (0+1) -0.08 -0.26 0.80 °* 
CAR (0+2) -0.25 -0.63 0.53 55 
CAR (0+3) -0.68 -1.68* 0.10 63 
CAR (0,-4) -0.87 -1-79* 0.08 60 
CAR (0+5) -1-01 -1-81* 0.08 65 
CAR (-1,0) -0.63 -2.27** 0.03 65 ^ 
CAR (-1+2) -0.42 -0.98 0.33 58 
CAR (-1+3) -0.86 -1.91* 0.06 60^ 
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Table 3: Long run stock market returns 
This table contains mean and median long run industry-adjusted abnormal returns for the privatized banks. The 
return measures are the difference between the market-adjusted abnormal returns of the privatized banks and 
those of their rivals The cumulative market-adjusted returns are from month 1 to month 60 relative to the share 
issue month (month 0). The figures in parentheses are t-statistics for mean returns or z-statistics for the median 
returns or percentage positive. The symbols ***"'* indicate significance at the 1%, 5 % and 10% level 
respectively. 
Event period 
First Year 
Second Year 
Third Year 
Fourth Year 
Fifth Year 
Panel A: Abnormal Return 
Median 
% Mean CAR%CAR 
-1.07 
(-0.22) 
5.18 
(1.30) 
-1.39 
(-0.33) 
2.03 
(0.35) 
0.90 
(0.15) 
0.82 
(0.80) 
8.00 
(3.62)*** 
-1.27 
(-0.24) 
5.76 
(2.55)** 
3.65 
(1.05) 
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Event period 
C A R (1-12) 
C A R (1-24) 
C A R (1-36) 
C A R (1.48) 
C A R (i_60) 
Mean % C A R Median % C A R 
-1.07 
(-0.22) 
3.70 
(0.67) 
2.21 
(0.39) 
3.46 
(0.56) 
4.55 
(0.61) 
0.82 
(0.80) 
5.84 
(1.71)* 
0.27 
(103) 
-1.55 
(-0.51) 
3.70 
(155) 
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Table 6: Results of regression to account for persistence in bank performance 
The table presents the results of the regression of the post-privatization ratios on the pre-
privatization ratios to account for persistence in bank performance. The regression variables are 
based on C A M E L criteria. C A M E L stands for Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management 
efficiency, Earnings ability and Labor (employment levels). Specifically for each performance 
measure we estimate the following regression: 
Post privatization ratio, = a, + /? (Pre-privatization ratioj + et 
The mean pre-privatization ratios are calculated over the year -5 to year -1 period and the mean 
post-privatization ratios are calculated over year +1 to year +5, relative to year 0. For robustness 
test, we also estimate the regressions using 3-year mean pre- and 3-year mean post-privatization 
data. The symbols ***,**,* represent significance at 1%, 5 % and 1 0 % respectively. 
Post-Privatization Alpha Beta 
3-year 5-year 3-year 5-year 
Performance mean m e a n m e a n m e a n 
Measures ratios ratios ratios ratios 
Capital Adequacy 10.16 10.25 0.15 0.15 
(9.91)*** (11.07)*** (2.80)** (3.07)*** 
Provisions-to-Loans 0.76 0.62 -0.03 0.03 
(2.08)** (1.66) (-0.20) (0.17) 
Gross Impaired Assets-to-
Loans 2.71 3.04 0.19 0.16 
(2.35)** (2.37)** (1.21) (0.88) 
Net Impaired Assets-to-
L o a n s 2.24 2.62 0.21 0 17 
(2.46)** (2.57)** (1.31) (0.83) 
Growth in Staff 
Levels
 0.45 0.83 0 22 0 36 
(0.24) (0.37) (0.85) (1.10) 
Return on Asset 0.87 0.82 -0 26 -0 22 
(4-24)*~ (4.38)*** (-150) (-1.38) 
Return on Equity 12.50 11.78 -0 09 -0 08 
r .. . (2-73)** (2.58)** (-1.00) (-1.02) 
Cost-to-income 27.68 20.70 0 70 0 78 
E*Pense-,o-Asse,s «ffl <°|> £«> <^> 
Ne, interest Margin ($T ^T ^f ^ 
(0.10) (-0.05) (49.35)*** (49.17)* 
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Table 7: Effects of bank privatization in developed and developing countries 
This table summarizes the stock market returns and operating performance measures of 
privatized banks in developed and developing countries. Panel A shows the abnorma 
returns realized by the industry counterparts of the privatized banks. Panel B presets 
the long run stock market performance, while Panel C presents the pre- and cost 
privatization ratios and the associated t-statistics for the sample based on the CAMEL 
criteria. CAMEL stands for Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management efficiency 
Earnings ability and Labor (employment levels). The mean pre-privatization ratios are 
calculated over the year -5 to year -1 period and the mean post-privatization ratios are 
calculated over year +1 to year +5, relative to year 0. The symbols *** ** * represent 
significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% respectively. 
Panel A: Rival firms reaction to privatization announcements 
CAR (-1,0) 
0 
CAR(0,+1) 
CAR (0,+2) 
CAR (0,+3) 
CAR (0,+4) 
CAR (0,+5) 
CAR(-1,+2) 
CAR(-1,+3) 
CAR(-1,+1) 
CAR (-2,+2) 
CAR (-5,+5) 
Panel B: Lon 
Event period 
C A R (1.12) 
C A R (1-24) 
C A R (i _36) 
C A R (1-48) 
C A R (1.60) 
Developed Countries 
t_ 
Mean statistics p-value 
-0.33 -
-0.26 -
-0.21 
-0.39 
-0.25 
-0.40 
-0.37 
-0.33 
-0.47 
-0.29 
-0.70 
-0.68 
•1.99** 
•2.49** 
-1.14 
-1.05 
-0.94 
-1.05 
-1.05 
-1.26 
-1.67* 
-1.37 
-1.48 
-1.20 
0.05 
0.02 
0.26 
0.29 
0.34 
0.29 
0.29 
0.20 
0.10 
0.17 
0.14 
0.23 
Middle and Low income 
> countries 
t-
Mean statistics p-
-0.31 -0.71 
-0.32 -0.85 
-1.32 -1.93 
-2.24 -1.87* 
-2.80 -2.49** 
-2.73 -2.45** 
-2.06 -1.59 
-2.24 -1.77* 
-2.80 -2.38 
-1.31 -1.65 
-1.94 -1.58 
-0.78 -0.62 
value 
0.49 
0.41 
0.07 
0.07 
0.02 
0.02 
0.12 
0.09 
0.03 
0.11 
0.13 
0.54 
g run industry adjusted cumulative abnormal returns 
Developed Countries 
Mean % 
Returns 
-1.07 
(-0.22) 
3.70 
(0.67) 
2.21 
(0.39) 
3.46 
(0.56) 
4.55 
(0.61) 
Median % 
Returns 
0.82 
(0.80) 
5.84 
(1.71)* 
0.27 
(1.03) 
-1.55 
(-0.51) 
3.70 
(1.55) 
Middle-and-Low Income 
countries 
Median % 
Mean%CAR Returns 
-8.02 
(-0.47) 
1.00 
(0.08) 
-10.28 
(-0.60) 
-13.00 
(-0.76) 
-19.32 
(-1.06) 
-6.63 
(-0.60) 
-5.11 
(-0.31) 
-4.32 
(-0.72) 
1^.88 
(-0.68) 
-11.66 
(-1.11) 
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Appendix A: Definition of ratios 
Measures 
Capital Adequacy 
Asset Quality 
Management 
Efficiency 
Earnings Ability 
Employment 
Ratios 
Total Capital Adequacy 
Provi si ons-to-Loans 
Gross Impaired Assets-Loans 
Net Impaired Assets to Loans 
Cost-to-income 
Expense- to- Assets 
Net Interest Margin 
Return on Asset (ROA) 
Return on Equity (ROE) 
Growth in staff levels 
Calculation 
=Tier 1 + Tier 2 Capital 
General provision / Total loans 
Gross impaired assets /Total loans 
Gross impaired assets less provisions/ Total 
Loans 
Operating Expenses / Operating Income 
Operating Expenses /Average Assets 
Net Interest income/Average interest earning 
assets 
Net Profit Before Interest and Tax/Average 
Total Assets 
Net Profit After Tax/Average Shareholders 
Equity 
% change in staff levels 

